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09-29-2005, 05:49 AM
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Banned User
Join Date: Jul 2005
Location: UK
Posts: 49
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Battle of Tours, 732 CE
salams,
Dr ashraf, could you tell us about the impact of this battle on history and the Muslim view of it- cos revisionists question its importance.
Here is what Wikipedia says:
The Battle of Tours (often called the Battle of Poitiers, but not to be confused with the Battle of Poitiers, 1356) was fought on October 23, 732 (October 10, old-style calendar) between forces under the Frankish leader Charles Martel and an Islamic army led by Emir Abd er Rahman. During the battle, the Franks defeated the Islamic army and Emir Abd er Rahman was killed. The result of this battle stopped the northward advance of Islam from the Iberian peninsula. This battle is considered by most historians to be of macrohistorical importance, in that it may have halted the invasion of Europe by Muslims, and preserved Christianity as the controlling faith, during a period in which Islam was overrunning the remains of the old Roman and Persian Empires. Combatants
The Muslims in northern Spain had easily overrun Septimania, had set up a capital at Narbonne which they called Arbuna, giving its largely Arian inhabitants honorable terms, and quickly pacified the south and for some years threatened Frankish territories. Duke Eudes of Aquitaine had decisively defeated a major invasion force in 721 at the Battle of Toulouse, but Arab raids continued, in 725 reaching as far as the city of Autun in Burgundy. Threatened by both the Arabs in the south and by the Franks in the north, in 730 Eudes allied himself with Uthman ibn Naissa, called "Munuza" by the Franks, the Berber emir in what would later become Catalonia. As a gage, Uthman was given Eudes's daughter Lampade in marriage to seal the alliance, and Arab raids across the Pyrenees, Eudes' southern border, ceased [1]. However, the next year,Utaman rebelled against the governor of al-Andalus, Abd er Rahman. Abd er Rahman quickly crushed the revolt, and next directed his attention against the traitor's former ally, Eudes. According to one unidentified Arab, "That army went through all places like a desolating storm." Duke Eudes (called King by some), collected his army at Bordeaux, but was defeated, and Bordeaux was plundered. The slaughter of christians at the River Garonne was evidently horrific, western chronicles saying "God alone knows the number of the slain." The Muslim horsemen then utterly devasted that portion of Gaul, their own histories saying the "faithful pierced through the mountains, tramples over rough and level ground, plunders far into the country of the Franks, and smites all with the sword, insomuch that when Eudo came to battle with them at the River Garonne, and fled." Eudes appealed to the Franks for assistance, which Charles Martel only granted after Eudes agreed to submit to Frankish authority. In 732, the Arab raiding force was proceeding north toward the River Loire. A possible motive was the riches of the Abbey of Saint Martin of Tours, the most prestigious and holiest shrine in western Europe at the time. Upon hearing this, Austrasian Mayor of the Palace Charles Martel collected his army of an estimated 15,000 - 75,000 veterans, and marched south. Location Despite the supposedly great importance of this battle, its exact location remains unknown. Most historians assume that the two armies met each other where the rivers Clain and Vienne join between Tours and Poitiers. The battle Charles positioned his army at a place where he expected the Muslim army to pass, at a defensive position. It is possible that his tightly packed infantry, armed with swords, spears and shield formed a phalanx-like formation. According to the Arabian sources they drew up in a large square. Certainly, given the disparity between the armies, in that the Franks were mostly infantry, against mounted, (and in the case of the Arabs) heavily armoured horsemen, Charles Martel fought a brilliant defensive battle. In a place and time of his choosing, he met a far superior force, and defeated it. For six days the two armies watched each other, with just minor skirmishes. Neither of them wanted to attack. The Franks were well dressed for the cold, and had the terrain advantage. The Arabs were not as prepared for the intense cold, but did not want to attack what they thought was a numerically superior Frankish army. The fight commenced on the seventh day, as Abd er Rahman did not want to postpone the battle indefinitely. Abd er Rahman trusted the numerical superiority of his cavalry, and had them charge repeatedly. This time the faith the Muslims had in their cavalry, armed with their long lances, long swords and spears, which had brought them victory in previous battles, was not justified. In one of the rare instances where medieval infantry stood up against cavalry charges, the disciplined Frankish soldiers withstood the assaults, though according to Arab sources, the Arab cavalry several times broke into the interior of the Frankish square. For the Frankish soldiers the heavy Saracen cavalry looked invincible: heavily armoured, with even their horses wearing protective armour. It is probable that the numerous Berber cavalry were just lightly armoured. The Franks thus fared much better against the Berber cavalry than against the Saracens. According to a Frankish source the battle lasted one day; according to Arab sources two days. When the rumour went through the Arab army that Frankish cavalry threatened the booty they had taken from Bordeaux, many returned to their camp. This, to the majority of the Muslim army, appeared to be a full-scale retreat, and soon it was one. While attempting to stop the retreat, Abd er Rahman became surrounded, which lead to his death, and the Muslims returned to their camp. The next day, when the Muslims did not renew the battle, the Franks feared an ambush. Only after extensive reconnaissance by Frankish soldiers of the Muslim camp was it discovered that the Muslims had retreated during the night. Aftermath The Arab army retreated south over the Pyrenees. Charles earned his nickname Martel, meaning hammer, in this battle. He continued to drive the Muslims from France in subsequent years. He would defeat the Moors in battle near the River Berre and the Narbonne. Importance of the battle Christian contemporaries, from Bede to Theophanes carefully recorded the battle and were keen to spell out what they saw as its implications. Later scholars, such as Edward Gibbon, would contend that had Martel fallen, the Moors would have easily conquered a divided Europe. Gibbon wrote that "A victorious line of march had been prolonged above a thousand miles from the rock of Gibraltar to the banks of the Loire; the repetition of an equal space would have carried the Saracens to the confines of Poland and the Highlands of Scotland; the Rhine is not more impassable than the Nile or Euphrates, and the Arabian fleet might have sailed without a naval combat into the mouth of the Thames. Perhaps the interpretation of the Qur'an would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Muhammed." Modern assessments of the battle's impact have backed away from the extreme of Gibbon's position. Contemporary Arab historians and chroniclers are much more interested in the Arab defeat at Constantinople in 718. Some contemporary historians argue that had the Arabs actually wished to conquer Europe they could easily have done so. Essentially these historians argue that the Arabs were not interested enough to mount a major invasion, because Northern Europe at that time was considered to be a socially, culturally and economically backward area with little to interest any invaders. But this is disputed by the records of the Islamic raids into India and other non-Muslim states for loot and converts. Given the great wealth in Christian shrines such as the one at Tours, Islamic expansion into that area would have been likely had it not been sharply defeated in 732 by Martel. Further evidence of the importance of this battle lies in Islamic expansion into all other regions of the old Roman Empire. It is not likely Gaul would have been spared save by the strength of Martel's legendary right arm and the loyalty of his veteran Frankish Army. Moreover, given the importance they placed on the death of Rahman and the defeat in Gaul, and the subsequent defeat and destruction of Muslim bases in what is now France, it is likely that this battle did have macrohistorical importance in stopping westward Islamic expansion. Gibbons and his generation of historians are probably more correct than the contemporary view that this battle lacked major historical impact. Arab histories written during that period and for the next several centuries make clear that Rahman's defeat and death was regarded, and rightly so, as a catastrophe of major proportions. Their own words record it best: (translated from Arabic) "This deadly defeat of the Moslems, and the loss of the great leader and good cavalier, Abderrahman, took place in the hundred and fifteenth year." This rather plainly puts the lie to those who would lowkey the macrohistorical importance of the Battle of Tours! Had Martel fallen at Tours the long term implications for European Christianity would likely have been devastating. |
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09-29-2005, 05:59 AM
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#2 |
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Banned User
Join Date: Jul 2005
Location: UK
Posts: 49
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Re: Battle of Tours, 732 CE
Another historian has said this:
"The defeat of Eudes left Charles with an ideal opportunity to strike at 'Abd al-Rahman ibn 'Abd Allah al-Ghafiqi, who had also taken losses in Bordeaux. That's how the relatively small Arab force under 'Abd al-Rahman ran into Charles near Poitiers, and was defeated in October 732. 'Abd al-Rahman was killed in this skirmish, which was thereafter blown up by chroniclers to heroic proportions, in versions that have traveled unchallenged down the centuries.
Recent research by Toulouse historian Sydney Forado shows that it was in fact the battle of Toulouse in 721, much more than the battle of Poitiers - sometimes called the battle of Tours - 11 years later, which prevented further, and possibly more permanent, Muslim gains in southern France. Just as significantly, Eudes's victory at Toulouse resulted in a number of Islamo-Christian political alliances in southwestern France, initiating those first crucial cultural and commercial exchanges between Muslim Spain on the one hand and Languedoc, Gascony, southern Aquitaine, the Pyrenees, Septimania and Provence on the other."
It's the stuff in bold that interests me- what kind of forces were involved? Historians say anything from 60,000 to 400,000... |
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10-01-2005, 05:54 AM
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#3 |
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Instructor, AlMaghrib Institute
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: Washington DC
Posts: 204
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Re: Battle of Tours, 732 CE
Salamu alaikum,
Thank you for your question. You have raised many important questions about how to interpret historical texts (historiography), as well as about a critical period in global history. Lets break this problem down into its component parts. I) A Regional Perspective There can be little question that the most decisive battles between the Muslims and the Franks occurred at Toulouse, (June 9th 721 C.E.) and at Poitiers/Tours (October 10th, 732 C.E.). However, in order to fully appreciate the significance of these battles, lets examine the Muslim invasion of France, as well as how the invasion of France fits into the world-historical position of Islamic civilization in the 8th century. According to Muslim historians Ibn al Athir (1160-1233 C.E.) and al Maqqari (1591-1632 C.E.), in his text Al Nafb al Tib (“The Pleasant Breeze”), once the Muslims had consolidated their position in Iberia in 718 C.E., they immediately directed raiding parties into southern and central France. By 719 C.E., the Muslims had penetrated Septimania, which roughly corresponds to the modern day region of Languedoc in S.E. France, and in 720 C.E., the Muslims captured the town of Narbonne, which is an important port city in Aude province of the Languedoc-Roussillon region. By the early 8th century, the Muslims had conquered and subdued Beziers, Agde, Lodeve, Monguelonne (Montpellier), and Nimes. Consequently, by the early 8th century, the Muslims had conquered most of the Longuedoc-Roussillon region (which is a significant part of S.E. France) and had built a large fortified garrison at the strategic port city Narbonne (which the Muslims called “Arbuna”). Using Narbonne as a base of operations, and supplemented by reinforcements from al Andalus, the Muslims boldly marched up central France, and in 725 C.E., reached as far north as the town of Autun, which is about 400 km southeast of Paris. Thus, by the early 8th century, the Muslims had not only conquered nearly all of Spain, but had further occupied the eastern Pyrenees Mountains, a large part of southeastern France, and were in a position to launch a full scale invasion of (Aquitaine) central France as well. Under these circumstances, it not difficult to understand that by the 720s, the Frankish nobility had become very alarmed at the Muslim invasion of their territory. I believe that this is the proper context in which we must understand the Battle of Toulouse, the first decisive battle between the Muslims and the Franks. According to some accounts, the Andalusian governor, al Samh ibn Malik al Khawlani led a force of 375-400,000 Muslims to besiege the city of Toulouse in early 721 C.E. (I have a lot more to say below about the numbers of troops quoted in these accounts, but for now let's take the numbers quoted for granted) Now, find a map of France and locate Toulouse. As you can see from the map, Toulouse is deep in south-central France, and was considered to be one of the main Frankish settlements. Consequently, had the Muslims succeeded in their siege of Toulouse, there would have been little to check their further advance into central and western France, and beyond. Hence, saving Toulouse was critical for the survival of the Frankish nobility and that is why on June 9, 721 C.E., Duke Eudes (Odo) of Aquitaine led an army against al Samh ibn Malik's army. Apparently, Duke Eudes encircled the Muslims from the rear, and so faced by the defenders of Toulouse and the army of Duke Eudes, the Muslims' position became untenable, forcing al Samh ibn Malik to retreat, which allowed the Duke's forces to defeat the Muslim army. Al Maqqari mentions that Duke Eudes led 350,000 men, while St. Denis records that 370,000 Muslim soldiers were annihilated at Toulouse, but we have to treat these figures with extreme caution (more about this later). Nevertheless, there seems to be a consensus between Muslim and non-Muslim sources that the battle of Toulouse was a disaster for the Muslims. Although defeated at Toulouse in 721 C.E., the Muslims maintained their position in southern and southeastern France, and so 11 years later, in 732 C.E., the Muslims once again tried to assert their dominance over central France. Distressed at the Muslim incursion, the most powerful noble of north-central France, Charles Martel ("the hammer"), desperately tried to reorganize the army that had defeated the Muslim forces 11 years earlier. Charles seemed to have been ruthless in taxing, stealing, and even extorting monies from Church property in order to finance his campaign against the Muslims. By mid-732, the worst fears of the Franks came to pass when a Muslim army led by Abd il Rahman al Ghafaqi reached the river Garrone, near Bordeaux, and soundly defeated Duke Eudes of Aquitaine, who had saved central France from the Muslim invasion only 11 years earlier. Consequently, by the time that the armies of Charles Martel and Abd il Rahman al Ghafiqi met, (somewhere between Poitiers and Tours) on October 10th 732 C.E., the Frankish nobility was thoroughly terrified by the advancing Muslim army. Based upon this narrative, it is obvious that the Battle of Poitiers/Tours was important because the Franks finally checked the Muslim advance into central France and in tandem with the earlier Battle of Toulouse (721 C.E.), demonstrated that the Franks could effectively counter the Muslim armies. This narrative also lends credence to the traditional views of the Battle of Poitiers, but certainly does not validate Edward Gibbon's claim that, had the Christians lost the Battle of Poitiers, there would be minarets towering over Oxford University, and English students would be speaking Arabic and learning the Qur'an. (Ironically, I am sure that today there is a mosque near Oxford and that students at that University do study the Qur'an as part of their core curriculum!!) However, the narrative that I have presented above should be qualified by the fact that the Muslims maintained a military presence in southeastern France for several decades after the Battle of Tours/Poitiers. Thus, in 737 C.E. the Muslims successfully captured the town of Avignon in southeast France, and it was not until 759 C.E. that King Pippin the Younger successfully dislodged the Muslim garrison from Narbonne, and thereafter the Muslims armies never again crossed the Pyrenees Mountains. II) An Imperial Perspective Now, let's take a broader Imperial perspective in order to more fully understand the importance of the Muslim penetration of southern and central France in the 8th century. While it is true that Muslim armies continued their efforts to conquer southern and central France until the mid-8th century, it is also true that the Muslims focused their energies elsewhere and could have theoretically committed even more resources to the conquest of France had they so desired. According to the Muslim sources, such as al Tabari, the main focus of the Umayyad armies in the late 7th and early 8th centuries C.E. was the Byzantine Empire in the east, and not the relatively impoverished and marginal Western Europe. Hence, while Christian sources written by authors from Western Europe pay an inordinate amount of attention to the Muslim invasion of Western Europe, the Muslim sources of that period are much more concerned with the Byzantine Empire and the Muslim invasion of the East. Consider if you will, the vast amounts of Muslim resources committed to the conquest of the Byzantine Empire and the city of Constantinople in particular. In fact, it was the Caliph Mu’awiya who first sent the Umayyad navy to besiege Constantinople between 674-681, which obviously proved unsuccessful. And in Aug. 716-Sept. 717, the Caliph Sulayman ibn abd il Malik sent his brother, Maslama ibn abd il Malik, to once again besiege Constantinople The Abbasids did not waver in this regard either, and the Caliph Harun al Rashid himself, led a siege of Constantinople between 781-782 C.E. And of course the Ottomans repeatedly besieged Constantinople in 1400 (Sultan Yildirim Bayezid), 1411 (Bayezid's son, Musa Chelabi), and again in 1422, when Sultan Murad II led his army to attack Constantinople. Thus, the conquest of that city by Sultan Mehmed II, in 1453, was the culmination of centuries of Muslim efforts to conquer the Byzantine capital. Why would the Muslims focus so much of their time and resources trying to capture the Byzantine capital city and showed no interest in France once the Abbasid revolution took place in 750 C.E., after wich al Andalus became an independent region under 'Abd il Rahman al Ummawi? In fact, after they had been expelled from Southern France in 759 C.E., the Muslims meekly submitted to Charlemagne and made no further attempt to cross the Pyrenees. Obviously, the Byzantine Empire was very wealthy compared to the relatively desolate Western Europe, and Western Europe contained no city as wealthy, or as prestigious, or as large as Constantinople. According to some estimates, France had about 3 million inhabitants by the early 8th century, which was roughly equal to the population of the Byzantine Empire, but while the Byzantines were the direct descendants of the Romans, the Frankish regions were far less important from a world-historical perspective. III) A Global-Geostrategic Perspective The invasion of Iberia and southern France should also be understood as part of the much broader Umayyid conquest of a super-region that stretched from southern France in the extreme West to western tip of China in the extreme East. From the mid-7th to mid-8th century, the Umayyids expanded the Muslim dominion in all directions of the compass simultaneously. Geostrategically, the speed and extent of the Muslim expansion was awesome and was surpassed in world historical terms only by the ruthless conquests of the Mongols in the 12th and 13th centuries. Thus, the Muslim expansion in southern France roughly coincides with the Muslim expansion in the East, which reached its farthest extent in 751 C.E., when the Muslims reached the Tlas River, where they met and defeated the armies of the T’ang Dynasty. While obviously impressive from a global perspective, the geographic extent of the Umayyad Empire was ultimately unsustainable. My colleague, Khalid Blankinship has written about this subject in his book; "The End of the Jihad State," (Syracuse Univ. Press, 1994). By the reign of the Caliph Hisham (724-743 C.E.), the Umayyad dynasty was experiencing what the historian Paul Kennedy has called “imperial overstretch”, due to the fiscal, political and demographic demands that the Umayyads were forced to endure in order to extend, maintain, and defend their globe-encompassing empire. According to Professor Blankinship, during the regin of the Caliph Hisham, the Umayyads were faced with a fiscal-financial crisis, as they sought to pay for recruitment and training of their military. The Umayyads were also faced by near simultaneous revolts in N. Africa, Sistan and Khurasan, as well internal distributional conflict between Qays and Kalb factions, who were the demographic backbone of the Umayyad war machine. The geostrategic position of the Umayyad Empire was thus unsustainable in the long run and from this perspective, the diversion of resources to the Western European theatre of operations was infeasible if not impossible. In fact, following the cataclysmic reign of the Caliph Hisham, North Africa remained largely autonomous throughout the remaining 1250 years of Islamic history, and so the survival of al Andalus as a socio-political entity until 1492, was ultimately the result of factors specific to Islamic civilization in N.W. Africa and to Spain itself. IV) The Historiography of Numbers Finally, let me say something about the numbers quoted in the source texts, (Ibn Athir, al Maqqari, St. Denis, etc.) as well as a few words about the logistical limitations that faced pre-modern military organizations. The Muslim and Christian sources devoted to the Muslim invasion of France mention that al Samh ibn Malik’s army at the battle of Toulouse was over 375,000, and that Abd il Rahman’s army at Tours/Poitiers was over 400,000. These numbers are hard to believe, because they would imply that the Muslims had a population base that would permit them to lose 375,000 soldiers at Toulouse, only to throw another 4000,000 troops into the French military theatre 11 years later. In order to maintain such numbers, the Muslims would have required a population base of 10-20 million to draw from. Otherwise, they would be unable to field such enormous armies (400,000 is 4% of 10 million and so both armies would represent 8% of a population of 10 million). But the total population of al Andalus and Northern Africa could not have been greater than 2-3 million. It is more reasonable to believe that the army led by Charles Martel was 15-30,000 and the army of Abd il Rahman was probably not much larger and could have been considerably smaller. Consequently, we should treat the numbers quoted by the sources with extreme caution. Logistical limitations upon pre-modern armies (communication, transportation, supply, regular meals, etc) meant that armies larger than 50,000 were difficult to maintain for more than a short period of time. Thus, it is unlikely that the Emperor Heraclius could have led an army at the battle of Yarmuk (636 C.E.) larger than 40,000 (it was probably smaller). Also, the army of Yazdegerd III at the battle of Nehewand (637 C.E.) probably did not reach the 100,000 mark, which is nevertheless recorded in some of the Muslim sources. A similar pattern can be observed in ancient and non-Muslim sources as well. For instance, the Greek historian Herodotus states that the Persian Emperor Xerxes, who invaded mainland Greece in 480 B.C.E., had an army that reached 250,000, which is hard to believe by the standards of the ancient world. The Roman Republic, which probably maintained the largest armies of the ancient world (outside of China), reached a size of 60 legions during the time of Gauis Marius, circa 80 B.C.E. Each legion consisted of about 4,800 soldiers, which means that the entire army of Republican Rome never went beyond 288,000 in total. Augustus, the first Roman Emperor, who ruled from 23 BCE until 14 CE, reduced the size of the Roman military to 28 legions. Each legion consisted of 6,000, which meant that the Roman army at the time of Augustus never went beyond 168,000 in total. In fact, it was not until the Emperor Diocletian (284-305 CE) that the Imperial legions were expanded to reach 300-400,000 in total. However, it must be remembered that even in the Roman case, the number of troops engaged in one campaign, or set of campaigns, usually did not surpass 50,000. For instance, at the battle of Cynoscephalae in 198 B.C.E., between the Romans and Phillip of Macedon, each side fielded armies of about 25,000 each. During the battle of Cannae in 216 B.C.E., Lucius Aemilius Paulus led a force of 50,000 against Hannibal’s 40,000, which made it one of the largest single battles of Roman history. And at the disastrous battle of Andrianople in 378 C.E., the Emperor Valens led an army of 7 legions, or 40,000 soldiers in total, most of who were massacred by the much smaller (10,000) Gothic army. Medieval European armies never reached the size of the Roman Imperial cohorts and even the all-conquering Mongols never fielded an army larger than 200,000 at any time. It was not until the era of Napoleon Bonaparte that armies again reached the size of 400-500,000, and it was not until the 20th century that national militaries could solve the logistical problems inherent to maintaining large armies, which permitted Nazi Germany to create an army of 5 million, the Americans to build a military that reached 15 million by 1945, and the Soviet Union, which probably had the largest military in recorded history, was able to create an army that reached 20 million at its peak in 1941. From this perspective, I think that the numbers quoted in the historical sources devoted to the Muslim invasion of France, and to the early Muslim conquests more generally, should be treated with a certain amount of cautious respect. Wa Allahu ‘alam, Ashraf Last edited by ashraf : 10-10-2005 at 01:45 AM. |
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10-09-2006, 02:38 PM
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#4 |
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Ummat Muhammad
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: al-jazair; algeria
Posts: 20
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Re: Battle of Tours, 732 CE
Edit.
Last edited by Naail : 04-09-2007 at 03:34 PM. |
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10-09-2006, 06:09 PM
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#5 |
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Instructor, AlMaghrib Institute
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: Washington DC
Posts: 204
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Re: Battle of Tours, 732 CE
Alaikum assalam,
Thank you for your question. Besides the original Arabic and non-Muslim sources that I have mentioned in the article, there are several modern texts that are useful: 1) Hugh Kennedy, Muslim Spain and Portugal: A History of al-Andalus, (Longman Press, 2002) 2) Olivia Remy Constable, Medieval Iberia: Readings from Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Sources, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997) 3) Bernard Reilly, Medieval Spains, (Cambridge University Press, 1993) 4) L. P. Harvey, Islamic Spain: 1250-1500, (Univ. of Chicago, 1994) 5) Maria Rosa Menocal, The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain, (Back Bay Books, 2002) 6) Richard Fletcher, Moorish Spain, (University of California Press, 1993) 7) A.I. Akram, The Muslim Conquest of Spain, (OUP Pakistan, 1986/1994) I have not read Akram's book, and if I had to choose, I would say that Hugh Kennedy and L.P. Harvey's books are the most scholarly and up to date, but Maria Menocal's text is also notable, because it is a Muslim friendly popular introduction. Finally, Olivia Constable's text is a translation of original sources, and although I have not read this book, I intend to within the next several months. I hope these suggestions are helpful. Ashraf |
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10-11-2006, 11:13 AM
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#6 |
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Ummat Muhammad
Join Date: May 2006
Location: America
Posts: 59
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Re: Battle of Tours, 732 CE
Dr. Ashraf, I love you for the sake of Allah!
I can't wait until you start teaching your new course. May Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) grant you and the other instructors jannat al firdaus. Ameen. |
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10-11-2006, 11:28 PM
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#7 |
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Instructor, AlMaghrib Institute
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: Washington DC
Posts: 204
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Re: Battle of Tours, 732 CE
Salamu alaikum,
Akramak Allah, wa ahabak Allah. May Allah love you. Thank you Brother. I dont think that anyone has ever given me such a wonderful compliment. May Allah grant you and your family the special blessings and mercy of Ramadan. Ashraf |
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